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Abstract. In this paper, we analyze the security of two
recently proposed distance bounding protocols called the
“Hitomi” and the “NUS” protocols. Our results show that the
claimed security of both protocols has been overestimated.
Namely, we show that the Hitomi protocol is susceptible to
a full secret key disclosure attack which not only results in
violating the privacy of the protocol but also can be exploited
for further attacks such as impersonation, mafia fraud and
terrorist fraud attacks. Our results also demonstrates that the
probability of success in a distance fraud attack against the
NUS protocol can be increased up to ( 34 )
n and even slightly
more, if the adversary is furnished with some computational
capabilities.
Keywords: RFID, Privacy, Distance bounding protocol,
Distance fraud
1 IN T R O D U C T I O N
Radio frequency identification (RFID) technology is widely being de-
ployed today in many applications which require security, such as
payment and access control applications. Although many solutions
have been proposed to secure RFID systems, most of them are still
susceptible to different attacks related to location such as: distance fraud,
mafia fraud and terrorist fraud attacks. All of these attacks aim at sug-
gesting a wrong assumption of the distance between a tag and a reader.
∗Department of Informatics, University of Bergen
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In distance fraud attack, a tag operates from out of the range where it
is supposed to be. Mafia fraud attack, is a kind of man-in-the-middle
attack in which a rogue tag circumvents the security mechanisms by
getting right answers from the legitimate tag via a rogue reader, while
both legitimate entities (legitimate reader and tag) remain unaware. In
the terrorist attack, a legitimate tag colludes with the adversary, giving
her the necessary information to access the system by impersonating it
for a limited number of times.
The described attacks require simpler technical resources than tam-
pering or cryptanalysis, and they cannot be prevented by ordinary
security protocols that operate in the high layers of the protocol stack.
The main countermeasure against these attacks is the use of distance
bounding protocols, which verify not only that the tag knows the cryp-
tographic secret, but also that is within a certain distance. To achieve
this goal, distance bounding protocols must be tightly integrated into
the physical layer [1].
In 1993, Brands and Chaum proposed the first distance bounding
protocol [5]. Afterward, in 2005, Hancke and Kuhn [6] proposed the first
distance-bounding protocol dedicated to RFID systems. This protocol
has the drawback of giving the adversary this chance to succeed with
the probability of ( 34 )
n rather than ( 12 )
n in distance and mafia fraud
attacks, where n is a security parameter. Since then, there have been
many solutions proposed either similar to Hancke and Kuhn [2, 7, 8, 10–
12] or with different structures [5, 8, 9, 13–15]. However, they mostly
have something in common; they all consist of three phases, the first
and the last ones called slow phases, and the second one called the fast
phase. The round trip time (RTT) of a bitwise challenge and response is
measured n times during the fast phase to estimate the distance, while
the slow phases include all the time-consuming operations.
Recently, two distance bounding protocols have been proposed by
Lopez et al and Gürel et al called Hitomi [4] and Non-Uniform Stepping
(NUS) [15] distance bounding protocols respectively. These protocols
are claimed to provide privacy and resistance against distance, mafia
and terrorist fraud attacks.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we apply a key disclosure attack to
the Hitomi protocol and a distance fraud attack on the NUS protocol.
Our analysis is framed in the formal framework introduced in [16].
Outline. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 includes a succinct description of the framework we do our security
analysis within. In Sections 3, we describe the Hitomi protocol, its
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security claims and our key disclosure attack on it. In Section 4, we
explain the NUS protocol and explain our distance fraud attack against
it, and finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 PR E L I M I N A R I E S
See Section 5.2.3 of the thesis.
2 .1 NO TAT I O N S
Here, we explain the notations used hereafter.
• x: Secret key of the tag.
• fx(.): Pseudo-Random Function operation with secret key x.
• hw(.): Hamming Weight calculation function.
• NR, NT : Random numbers generated by the reader and the tag
respectively.
• n: The length of registers considered as a security parameter.
2 .2 AS S U M P T I O N S
The protocols described in this paper are executed under following
assumptions:
• The tag and the reader share a long-term secret key x.
• Each tag has a unique identifier ID.
• The tag’s capabilities supports a Pseudo-Random Function ( f )
and can perform bitwise operations.
• The reader and the tag agree on:
– a security parameter n.
– a public pseudo random function f with length of n bits.
– a timing bound tmax
– a fault tolerance threshold τ.
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3 TH E H I TO M I PR O TO C O L
3.1 DE S C R I P T I O N
As stated in Section 1, being a distance bounding protocol, the Hitomi
protocol (Figure 1) consists of three phases, two slow phases which are
carried out at the first and final part of the protocol called preparation
phase and final phase respectively. And the fast phase which is executed
in between, called rapid bit exchange phase.
In the preparation phase, the reader chooses a random nonce (NR)
and transmits it to the tag. In return, the tag chooses three random
numbers NT1 , NT2 and NT3 and computes two temporary keys (k1 and
k2) as (1) and (2).
k1 = fx(NR, NT1 , W) (1)
k2 = fx(NT2 , NT3 , W
′) (2)
where W and W ′ represent two constant parameters. By using these
keys, the tag splits its permanent secret key x into two shares as response
registers(i.e. R0 = k1 and R1 = k2 ⊕ x). Finally, the tag transmits the
3-tuple {NT1 , NT2 , NT3} to the reader.
The rapid bit exchange phase is a challenge and response phase with
n rounds. In its ith round, the reader generates a random challenge
bit ci and sends it to the tag while initializing a clock to zero. The tag
receives c′i which may not be equal to ci due to errors or alterations
in the channel. Immediately upon receiving c′i, the tag responses with
r′i = R
ci
i . The reader stops the clock after receiving ri, which may not
be equal to r′i due to errors or alterations in the channel, and computes
the round trip time (RTT) of this challenge and response transaction
and stores it as ∆ti.
The final phase starts with computing and sending two following
messages from the tag to the reader.
m = {c′1, ..., c′n, r′1, ..., r′n} (3)
tB = fx(m, ID, NR, NT1 , NT2 , NT3) (4)
Finally, the reader computes three kinds of errors and checks whether
their summation is below a fault tolerance threshold as following.
• errc: the number of times that ci 6= c′i.
• errr: the number of times that ci = c′i but ri 6= Rcii .
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• errt: the number of times that ci = c′i but the response delay ∆ti
is more than a timing bound threshold tmax(∆ti > tmax).
If the reader authentication is also demanded, the reader computes
tA = fx(NR, k2) and transmits it to the tag. Once the tag checks its
correctness, the two entities are mutually authenticated.
The authors claim that the Hitomi protocol provides mutual authen-
tication between the tag and the reader and also guarantees privacy
protection. The authors argue that the success probability of the mafia
and distance fraud attacks against their scheme is bounded by ( 12 )
n.
3 .2 KE Y D I S C L O S U R E AT TA C K
In this section, we present an attacking scenario to the Hitomi protocol
which leads to tag’s secret key disclosure. Our main assumption in this
attack is that the reader authentication is not demanded and so the
protocol is executed without the optional message tA. This allows an
unauthorized reader(adversary) to query the tag several times without
being detected.
Algorithm 1 portrays how an adversary is able to extract ∆ bits of
the tag’s secret key by querying the tag m times.
The algorithm starts with the preparation phase in which at mth run,
the adversary first generates a new random number NR, sends it to the
tag and receives the 3-tuple of {NT1 , NT2 , NT3} in return.
The rapid bit exchange phase of the algorithm starts with generation
of a challenge vector by the adversary which contains ∆ bits of 1 and
n− ∆ bits of 0 (c(m)). By sending the bits of this challenge vector to
the tag in n rounds of the rapid bit exchange phase and receiving the
responses, the adversary obtains n− ∆ bits of R0 = k1 and ∆ bits of
R1 = k2 ⊕ x.
We know that if the adversary is able to find k1, she will be able
to calculate k2 by (2). Now, the adversary requires to search over all
possible 2∆ values for k1. If we observe the output of fk1(N
(m)
T2
, N(m)T3 , W
′)
in the mth run of the protocol for 2∆ times, each time with one different
possible value of k1, we will see that the number of values for the first
∆ bits of k2 (k2(1), ..., k2(∆)) is less than 2∆. This can be calculated by a
well-known problem in probability theory described in Remark 1.
Each k2 nominates one X∆ = (x(1), ..., x(∆)) for ∆ bits of the tag’s
secret key (Line 16 of the Algorithm 1). So, each time the adversary
queries the tag, she will obtain a set of potential candidates for X∆.
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Reader Tag
x, ID x, ID
NR ∈R {0, 1}n
NR−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
NT1 , NT2 , NT3 ∈R {0, 1}n
NT1 ,NT2 ,NT3←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
k1 = fx(NR, NT1 ,W )
k2 = fk1(NT2 , NT3 ,W
′){
R0 = k1
R1 = k2 ⊕ x
Start of rapid bit exchange
for i = 1...n
ci ∈ {0, 1}
start clock
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
r′i = R
c′i
i
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
stop clock
Compute ∆ti
End of rapid bit exchange
m = {c′1, ..., c′n, r′1, ..., r′n}
tB = fx(m, ID,NR, NT1 , NT2 , NT3)
m,tB←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Check ID in the Database
Compute R0, R1
errc = #{i : ci 6= c′i}
errr = #{i : ci = c′i, ri 6= Rcii }
errt = #{i : ci = c′i,∆ti > tmax}
if errc + errr + errt ≥ τ
REJECT
else
tA = fx(NR, k2)
tA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Compute and Compare tA
Fig. 2. Hitomi RFID Distance Bounding
3.2 Key Disclosure Attack
In this section, we present an attacking scenario to the Hitomi protocol which
leads to tag’s secret key disclosure. Our main assumption in this attack is that
the reader authentication is not demanded and so the protocol is executed with-
out the optional message tA. This allows an unauthorized reader(adversary) to
query the tag several times without being detected.
Fig. 1: Hitomi Distance Bounding Protocols.
If she continues querying the tag, each time she will obtain a set of
different candidates.
These candidates can be re oved from the list by further querying,
unless they re nominated in the other runs. And the final candidate
is the one which has been in the candidate list in all the queries. The
number of times that the adversary must query the tag to be left with
only one candidate is calculated by (7) and plotted in Figures 2 and 3.
Remark 1. Consider the process of tossing b balls into b bins. The
tosses are uniformly at random and independent of each other. The
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Algorithm 1 ∆ bit secret key disclosure
Inputs: n,∆, W, W ′
Outputs: m,∆ bits of secret key x (x1, ..., x∆)
1: m← 1 {number of required runs of the protocol}
2: repeat
3: Numbero f Candidates← 0
4: FinalCandidate← 0
5: {counter(1), ..., counter(2∆)} ← {0x0, ..., 0x0}
6: {CandidateFlag(1), ..., CandidateFlag(2∆)} ← {0x0, ..., 0x0}
7: Generate N(m)R and Send to the tag.
8: Receive N(m)T1 , N
(m)
T2
, N(m)T3
9: c(m) ← (1, ..., 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
, 0, ..., 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−∆
)
10: send the challenges to the tag in n rounds and receive the re-
sponses.
11: r(m) ← (r(m)
(1) , ..., r
(m)
(n) )
12: (k1(∆+1), ..., k1(n))← (r(m)(∆+1), ..., r
(m)
(n) )
13: for i = 0 to 2∆ − 1 do
14: (k1(1), ..., k1(∆))← Decimal2Binary(i)∗
15: (k2(1), ..., k2(n))← fk1(N
(m)
T2
, N(m)T3 , W
′)
16: (x(1), ..., x(∆))← (k2(1), ..., k2(∆))⊕ (r(m)(1) , ..., r
(m)
(∆) )
17: l ← Binary2Decimal(x(1), ..., x(∆))∗∗
18: if CandidateFlag(l) = 0 then
19: counter(l)← counter(l) + 1
20: CandidateFlag(l)← 1
21: end if
22: end for
23: for j = 1 to 2∆ do
24: if counter(j) = m then
25: Numbero f Candidates← Numbero f Candidates + 1
26: FinalCandidate← j
27: end if
28: end for
29: m← m + 1
30: until Numbero f Candidates = 1
31: (x(1), ..., x(∆))← Decimal2Binary(FinalCandidate)
32: return m, (x(1), ..., x(∆))
* Decimal2Binary(.) outputs the binary representation of a given decimal
number.
** Binary2Decimal(.) outputs the decimal representation of a given
binary number.
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probability of not falling any ball into a particular bin can be calculated
by (5) [17].
Pr(one particular bin remains empty) = p0 =
(
1− 1
b
)b
≈ 1
e
, b 1
(5)
Hence, the probability that a ball does not remain empty is simply
p1 = 1− p0. Due to independency, if we repeat the same experiment for
m trials, the probability that one particular bin remains empty at least
in one of m trials is 1− pm1 . Now, we can calculate the probability that
all bins experience to be empty at least in one of m trials (Pr(Success))
by (6).
Pr(Success) = (1− pm1 )b =
(
1−
(
1−
(
1− 1
b
)b)m)b
(6)
≈
[
1−
(
1− 1
e
)m]b
, b 1
For our problem it is only required to substitute b with 2∆ and we will
have:
PSucc = Pr(Success) =
1−(1−(1− 1
2∆
)2∆)m2∆ (7)
Figure 2 illustrates the probability of success calculated in (7) while the
number of protocol runs are increased. The figures have been plotted for
∆ = 4,8,16 and 32, which should be chosen according to computational
constraints. So far, we have accomplished to find the first ∆ bits of the
tag’s secret key with a certain probability. In a similar vein, one can
find other bits of the secret key by choosing a different challenge vector
(e.g. for finding (x(∆+1), ..., x(2∆)) the challenge should be chosen like
(8) and the above algorithm should be executed another time).
c = (0, ..., 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
, 1, ..., 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
, 0, ..., 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−2∆
) (8)
In this way, the adversary accomplishes to find the whole tag’s secret
key, if she can query the tag for enough times. Figure 3 illustrates the
number of runs of the protocol which an adversary must query the
tag and its probability of success to find the entirety of tags’s secret
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Fig. 2: Adversary success probability to
find ∆ bits of the secret key.
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Fig. 3: Adversary success probability to
find the whole secret key for ∆ = 16.
key, assuming that her computational capability is limited to 2∆ = 216
computations. The computations include: searching over 2∆ values of
k1, finding k2 for each k1 and candidate one X∆.
The graphs have been plotted for four different key sizes n = 32, 64, 80
and 128. For instance, the adversary is required to query the tag about
70, 140, 175 and 280 times to find the tag’s secret keys of size 32, 64, 80
and 128 bits with the probability of about 0.9 respectively.
It is obvious that having this attack accomplished, the adversary is
able to easily either track or impersonate the tag in further interroga-
tions. The information elicited in this attack also paves the way for
performing other attacks such as mafia or terrorist fraud attacks.
4 TH E NUS PR O TO C O L
4.1 DE S C R I P T I O N
The NUS protocol (Figure 4) also consists of three phases, two slow
phases a fast called rapid bit exchange phase.
In the first slow phase, the reader chooses a random nonce(NR) and
transmits it to the tag. In return, the tag chooses another random
number(NT) and computes the response register R = fx(NR, NT),
which is of length 2n. The tag then initializes the variables j1, j2, k1
and k2 to 1, n, 0 and 2n + 1 respectively and sends back NT to the
reader.
111
Security Analysis Of Lightweight Schemes for RFID Systems
In the ith round of the rapid bit exchange phase, the reader generates
a random challenge bit ci and sends it to the tag while initializing a
clock to zero. The tag receives c′i which may not be equal to ci due to
errors or alterations in the channel. Immediately upon receiving c′i, the
tag sends the bit r′i , computed according to the procedure shown in
Figure 4.
The final phase concludes with sending the message m which consists
of all challenges the tag has received, from the tag to the reader and
finally, the error computation which is almost the same as in the Hitomi
protocol.
The authors claim that the success probability of the distance, mafia
and terrorist fraud attacks against the NUS protocol is bounded by ( 12 )
n.
4 .2 D I S TA N C E F R A U D AT TA C K
In this section, we present a distance fraud attack on the NUS protocol
in two different forms in white-box model: restricted adversary and pow-
erful adversary. The main assumption we have is that the adversary is
located at zone Z1, i.e. at the ith round of the rapid bit exchange phase,
the adversary accesses to the value of the challenge bit in previous
round ci−1, before generating current response ri. This assumption im-
plies that the adversary is able to update the registers j1, j2, k1 and k2
and she is aware of their correct current values, before she generates
the response.
Restricted adversary
The adversary is allowed to run only once the pseudo-random function
f function to compute R and observe its content before any response.
The probability of success for the distance fraud attack in this model
can be calculated by (9).
Pdis = Pr(Success|xj1xj2 = 00)Pr(xj1xj2 = 00)
+ Pr(Success|xj1xj2 = 01)Pr(xj1xj2 = 01)
+ Pr(Success|xj1xj2 = 10)Pr(xj1xj2 = 10)
+ Pr(Success|xj1xj2 = 11)Pr(xj1xj2 = 11) (9)
If xj1xj2 = 00 and without knowing ci, the adversary should antici-
pate the right response(ri) between Rk1+1 and Rk2−1. Let us define the
probability of equality of these two bits by (10).
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Reader Tag
x, ID x, ID
NR ∈R {0, 1}n
NR−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
NT ∈R {0, 1}n
R = fx(NR, NT ), |R| = 2n
j1 = 1, j2 = n
k1 = 0, k2 = 2n+ 1
NT←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Start of rapid bit exchange
for i = 1...n
ci ∈ {0, 1}
start clock
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
if c′i = 0
if xj1 = 0
k1 = k1 + 1, r′i = Rk1
else
k2 = k2− 2, r′i = Rk2
j1 = j1 + 1
else
if xj2 = 0
k2 = k2− 1, r′i = Rk2
else
k1 = k1 + 2, r′i = Rk1
j2 = j2− 1
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
stop clock, Compute ∆ti
End of rapid bit exchange
m = {c′1, ..., c′n}
m
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
errc = #{i : ci 6= c′i}
Compute (r′i)
′s using (c′i)
′s
errr = #{i : ci = c′i, ri 6= r′′i }
errt = #{i : ci = c′i,∆ti > tmax}
Checks errc + errr + errt ≤ τ
Fig. 5. The NUS Distance Bounding Protocol
If Rk1+1 = Rk2−1, the adversary can simply outputs either of these two bits and
succeeds with the probability 1. Otherwise, she outputs a random bit and she
will have the success probability of 12 . So,
Pr(Success|xj1xj2 = 00) = 1× Peq + 1
2
× (1− Peq) = (1 + Peq)
2
(13)
Fig. 4: The NUS Distance Bounding Protocol
Peq = Pr(Rk1+1 = Rk2−1) (10)
So, we have,
Pr(Success|xj1xj2 = 00) = Pr(Success|xj1xj2 = 00, Rk1+1 = Rk2−1)(Peq)
+ Pr(Success|xj1xj2 = 00, Rk1+1 6= Rk2−1)(1− Peq)
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If Rk1+1 = Rk2−1, the adversary can simply outputs either of these
two bits and succeeds with the probability 1. Otherwise, she outputs a
random bit and she will have the success probability of 12 . So,
Pr(Success|xj1xj2 = 00) = 1× Peq + 12 × (1− Peq) =
(1 + Peq)
2
(11)
We can do similar calculations for other three possibilities of xj1xj2. Since
all four possibilities of xj1xj2 are equally likely, we have the probability
of success for a distance fraud attack in one round as (12).
Pdis =
(1 + Peq)
2
(12)
In a similar vein, one can show that due to independency of the n
rounds, the adversary obtains the success probability of ( 1+Peq2 )
n for n
rounds. If we assume that zeros and ones are equally likely, Peq equals
to 12 and for n rounds we have:
Pdis = (
3
4
)n (13)
Powerful adversary
Our main assumptions in this attack are as following. We assume
that, there is a 1-second latency between the preparation and rapid bit
exchange phases of the protocol. It implies that the adversary can run
the pseudo-random function f for c times between the preparation and
the rapid bit exchange phases, where c the number of a simple random
number function like a hash function that can be computed per second
on a single PC [16].
In [16], Avoine et al has presented an instance of a distance fraud
attack against a white-box-modeled tag in Hancke and Kuhn protocol.
They have devoted the white-box modeled tag’s capabilities to mini-
mize the hamming weight difference of n-bit response registers in the
Hancke and Kuhn protocol(hw(R0 ⊕ R1)). They have proved that if
Pi = Pr(success|(hw(R0 ⊕ R1) = i)), the probability of success in the
distance fraud attack can be calculated by (14).
Pdis =
(
1
2
)cn
×
i=n−1∑
i=0
(Pi)
(j=n∑
j=i
(
n
j
))c
−
(
j=n
∑
j=i+1
(
n
j
))c+ 1

(14)
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n=32 n=64 n=80 n=128
Claimed 2.3283E-10 5.4210E-20 8.2718E-25 2.9387E-39
Security
Restricted 1.0045E-4 1.0090E-8 1.0113E-10 1.0183E-16
Adversary
Powerful 0.0035 4.5101E-7 4.7459E-9 5.1498E-15
Adversary
Table 1: Comparison of the probability of success for distance fraud attack against the
NUS protocol for c = 223 ≈ E6.
In order to utilize (14) for our purpose, we define Pi = Pr(Success|hw(R) =
i). This implies that, we devote the tag’s capability to minimize the
hamming weight of the response register R in the NUS protocol. Hav-
ing this in mind and by using (12), we can calculate Pi for n rounds as
following.
Peq = (
i
2n
)2 + (
2n− i
2n
)2 = 1 +
i2 − 2in
2n2
Pi = Pdis =
[
(1 + Peq)
2
]n
=
(
1 +
i2 − 2in
4n2
)n
(15)
As the response register R in the NUS protocol is of length 2n, we only
need to substitute n by 2n and Pi by (15) in (14). Table 1 compares
the claimed security of the NUS protocol and our results in restricted
and powerful adversary models in terms of the probability of success
of an adversary in the distance fraud attack. For example, for n = 32,
the probability of success in the distance fraud attack in a restricted
adversary model is 1.0045E-4. This probability improves to 0.0035 in
a powerful adversary model for c = 223 which roughly represents the
number of hashes that can be computed today per second on a single
PC [16]. These probabilities are remarkably beyond the claimed security
( 12 )
32 = 2.3283E-10.
5 CO N C L U S I O N S
The design of a secure distance bounding protocol which can resist
against the existing attacks for RFID systems is still challenging. Despite
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of interesting proposals in the literature, this field still lacks a concrete
solution.
Recently, two solutions have been proposed for this purpose called
the Hitomi and the NUS distance bounding protocols. We presented a
secret key disclosure attack on the former and a distance fraud attack
on the latter protocol. Our results showed that the security margins
which was expected to be yielded by them have been overestimated.
We showed that the Hitomi protocol is vulnerable to a full secret key
disclosure attack by querying the tag several times. In addition, the
probability of success in a distance fraud attack against the NUS proto-
col was shown to be able to be increased up to ( 34 )
n, if the adversary
gets close enough to the reader. This probability can even be slightly
improved, if the tag has some computational capabilities.
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